The Cases

"Appellants, the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, and its medical director, a licensed physician, were convicted as accessories for giving married persons information and medical advice on how to prevent conception and, following examination, prescribing a contraceptive device or material for the wife's use. A Connecticut statute makes it a crime for any person to use any drug or article to prevent conception. Appellants claimed that the accessory statute, as applied, violated the Fourteenth Amendment. An intermediate appellate court and the State's highest court affirmed the judgment." READ THE DECISION.

"Appellee physician's indictments for producing and attempting to produce abortions in violation of D.C.Code § 22-201 was dismissed by the District Court on the ground of unconstitutional vagueness. That court held that the word "health" was overly vague, and, relying on Williams v. United States, 78 U.S.App.D.C. 147, 138 F.2d 81, held that, once an abortion is proved, the burden is on the doctor to persuade the jury that it was necessary to preserve the mother's life or health. The Government appealed to this Court under the Criminal Appeals Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3731." READ THE DECISION

"Appellee attacks his conviction of violating Massachusetts law for giving a woman a contraceptive foam at the close of his lecture to students on contraception. That law makes it a felony for anyone to give away a drug, medicine, instrument, or article for the prevention of conception except in the case of (1) a registered physician administering or prescribing it for a married person or (2) an active registered pharmacist furnishing it to a married person presenting a registered physician's prescription. The District Court dismissed appellee's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court of Appeals vacated the dismissal, holding that the statute is a prohibition on contraception per se, and conflicts "with fundamental human rights" under Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479. Appellant, inter alia, argues that appellee lacks standing to assert the rights of unmarried persons denied access to contraceptives because he was neither an authorized distributor under the statute nor a single person unable to obtain contraceptives." READ THE DECISION.

"Georgia law proscribes an abortion except as performed by a duly licensed Georgia physician when necessary in "his best clinical judgment" because continued pregnancy would endanger a pregnant woman's life or injure her health; the fetus would likely be born with a serious defect; or the pregnancy resulted from rape. § 26-1202(a) of Ga. Criminal Code. In addition to a requirement that the patient be a Georgia resident and certain other requirements, the statutory scheme poses three procedural conditions in § 26-1202(b): (1) that the abortion be performed in a hospital accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH); (2) that the procedure be approved by the hospital staff abortion committee; and (3) that the performing physician's judgment be confirmed by independent examinations of the patient by two other licensed physicians. Appellant Doe, an indigent married Georgia citizen, who was denied an abortion after eight weeks of pregnancy for failure to meet any of the § 26-1202(a) conditions, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, contending that the Georgia laws were unconstitutional. Others joining in the complaint included Georgia-licensed physicians (who claimed that the Georgia statutes "chilled and deterred" their practices), registered nurses, clergymen, and social workers. Though holding that all the plaintiffs had standing, the District Court ruled that only Doe presented a justiciable controversy. In Doe's case the court gave declaratory, but not injunctive, relief, invalidating as an infringement of privacy and personal liberty the limitation to the three situations specified in § 26-1202(a) and certain other provisions, but holding that the State's interest in health protection and the existence of a "potential of independent human existence" justified regulation through § 26-1202(b) of the "manner of performance as well as the quality of the final decision to abort." The appellants, claiming entitlement to broader relief, directly appealed to this Court." READ THE DECISION.

"A pregnant single woman (Roe) brought a class action challenging the constitutionality of the Texas criminal abortion laws, which proscribe procuring or attempting an abortion except on medical advice for the purpose of saving the mother's life. A licensed physician (Hallford), who had two state abortion prosecutions pending against him, was permitted to intervene. A childless married couple (the Does), the wife not being pregnant, separately attacked the laws, basing alleged injury on the future possibilities of contraceptive failure, pregnancy, unpreparedness for parenthood, and impairment of the wife's health. A three-judge District Court, which consolidated the actions, held that Roe and Hallford, and members of their classes, had standing to sue and presented justiciable controversies. Ruling that declaratory, though not injunctive, relief was warranted, the court declared the abortion statutes void as vague and overbroadly infringing those plaintiffs' Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court ruled the Does' complaint not justiciable. Appellants directly appealed to this Court on the injunctive rulings, and appellee cross-appealed from the District Court's grant of declaratory relief to Roe and Hallford." READ THE DECISION.

"A three-judge District Court, which entered a declaratory judgment holding a state abortion statute unconstitutional, properly refused to issue an injunction against enforcement of the statute, where there was no allegation or proof that the State would not acquiesce in the declaratory judgment." READ THE DECISION.

"Connecticut statute making criminal an attempted abortion by "any person" held to remain fully effective against performance of abortions by nonphysicians after Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179." READ THE DECISION.

"Appellant, the managing editor of a weekly newspaper published in Virginia, as the result of publishing a New York City organization's advertisement announcing that it would arrange low-cost placements for women with unwanted pregnancies in accredited hospitals and clinics in New York (where abortions were legal and there were no residency requirements), was convicted of violating a Virginia statute making it a misdemeanor, by the sale or circulation of any publication, to encourage or prompt the processing of an abortion. The trial court had rejected appellant's claim that the statute was unconstitutional under the First Amendment as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth as being facially overbroad and as applied to appellant. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, also rejecting appellant's First Amendment claim and holding that the advertisement was a commercial one which could be constitutionally prohibited under the State's police power, and that, because appellant himself lacked a legitimate First Amendment interest inasmuch as his activity "was of a purely commercial nature," he had no standing to challenge the statute as being facially overbroad." READ THE DECISION.

"Two Missouri-licensed physicians, one of whom performs abortions at hospitals and the other of whom supervises abortions at Planned Parenthood, a not-for-profit corporation, brought suit, along with that organization, for injunctive and declaratory relief challenging the constitutionality of the Missouri abortion statute. The provisions under attack are: § 2(2), defining "viability" as

"that stage of fetal development when the life of the unborn child may be continued indefinitely outside the womb by natural or artificial life supportive systems;"

§ 3(2), requiring that, before submitting to an abortion during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, a woman must consent in writing to the procedure and certify that "her consent is informed and freely given, and is not the result of coercion"; § 3(3), requiring, for the same period, the written consent of the spouse of a woman seeking an abortion unless a licensed physician certifies that the abortion is necessary to preserve the mother's life; § 3(4), requiring, for the same period, and with the same proviso, the written consent of a parent or person in loco parentis to the abortion of an unmarried woman under age 18; § 6(1), requiring the physician to exercise professional care to preserve the fetus' life and health, failing which he is deemed guilty of manslaughter and is liable in an action for damages; § 7, declaring an infant who survives an attempted abortion not performed to save the mother's life or health an abandoned ward of the State, and depriving the mother and a consenting father of parental rights; § 9, prohibiting, after the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, the abortion procedure of saline amniocentesis as "deleterious to maternal health"; and §§ 10 and 11, prescribing reporting and recordkeeping requirements for health facilities and physicians performing abortions. The District Court ruled that the two physicians had "obvious standing" to maintain the suit, and that it was therefore unnecessary to determine if Planned Parenthood also had standing. On the merits, the court upheld the foregoing provisions with the exception of § 6(1)'s professional skill requirement, which was held to be "unconstitutionally overbroad" because it failed to exclude the pregnancy stage prior to viability." READ THE DECISION.

"Respondents, two Missouri-licensed physicians, brought this action for injunctive relief and a declaration of the unconstitutionality of a Missouri statute that excludes abortions that are not "medically indicated" from the purposes for which Medicaid benefits are available to needy persons. In response to petitioner's pre-answer motion to dismiss, each respondent averred that he had provided, and anticipated providing, abortions to needy patients, and that petitioner, the responsible state official, acting in reliance on the challenged statute, had refused all Medicaid applications filed in connection with such abortions. A three-judge District Court dismissed the relevant count of the complaint for lack of standing, having concluded that no logical nexus existed between the status asserted by respondents and the claim that they sought to have adjudicated. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that respondents had alleged sufficient "injury in fact" and also an interest "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected . . . by the . . . constitutional guarantees in question." That court then considered the case on the merits and found that the challenged statute clearly violated the Equal Protection Clause." READ THE DECISION.

"Title XIX of the Social Security Act establishes a Medical Assistance (Medicaid) program, under which participating States financially assist qualified individuals in five general categories of medical treatment, state plans being required to establish "reasonable standards . . . for determining . . . the extent of medical assistance under the plan which are consistent with" Title XIX's objectives. Respondents, who are eligible for medical assistance under Pennsylvania's Medicaid plan and who were denied financial assistance for desired non therapeutic abortions pursuant to state regulations limiting such assistance to abortions certified by physicians as medically necessary, brought this action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, contending that the certification requirement contravened Title XIX and denied them equal protection of the laws. A three-judge District Court decided the statutory issue against respondents, but the constitutional issue partially in their favor. The Court of Appeals, not reaching the constitutional question, reversed on the statutory issue, holding that Title XIX prohibits participating States from requiring a medical necessity certificate as a funding condition during the first two trimesters of pregnancy." READ THE DECISION.

"Section 6811(8) of the New York Education Law makes it a crime (1) for any person to sell or distribute any contraceptive of any kind to a minor under 16; (2) for anyone other than a licensed pharmacist to distribute contraceptives to persons 16 or over; and (3) for anyone, including licensed pharmacists, to advertise or display contraceptives. In appellees' action against appellant state officials challenging the constitutionality of $ 6811(8), a three-judge District Court declared the statute unconstitutional in its entirety under the First and Fourteenth Amendments insofar as it applies to non prescription contraceptives, and enjoined its enforcement as so applied." READ THE DECISION.

"The District Court's injunction against enforcement of the Louisiana abortion statute is vacated insofar as it bars enforcement of the "informed consent" requirements, and the case is remanded to that court to consider the construction of such requirements, their validity in light of Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 428 U. S. 65-67, and their severability from the remainder of the statute." READ THE DECISION.

"Appellees, two indigent women who were unable to obtain a physician's certificate of medical necessity, brought this action attacking the validity of a Connecticut Welfare Department regulation that limits state Medicaid benefits for first trimester abortions to those that are "medically necessary." A three-judge District Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the exclusion of non therapeutic abortions from a state welfare program that generally subsidizes the medical expenses incident to pregnancy and childbirth. The court found implicit in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179, the view that 'abortion and childbirth . . . are simply two alternative medical methods of dealing with pregnancy. . . .'" READ THE DECISION.

"The city of St. Louis, in electing, as a policy choice, to provide publicly financed hospital services for childbirth but not for nontherapeutic abortions, held not to violate any constitutional rights." READ THE DECISION.

"Where it appears that the District Court's judgment enjoining a South Carolina prosecution in connection with the abortion of a 25-week-old fetus may have been based on an erroneous concept of "viability," the judgment is vacated and the case is remanded for further consideration in light of Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 , and also for further consideration of abstention in view of the possible alternative constructions of the South Carolina criminal statutes." READ THE DECISION.

"A Massachusetts statute requires parental consent before an abortion can be performed on an unmarried woman under the age of 18. If one or both parents refuse such consent, however, the abortion may be obtained by order of a judge of the superior court "for good cause shown." In appellees' class action challenging the constitutionality of the statute, a three-judge District Court held it unconstitutional. Subsequently, this Court vacated the District Court's judgment,"

Bellotti v. Baird,

"Section 5(a) of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act requires every person who performs an abortion to make a determination, "based on his experience, judgment or professional competence," that the fetus is not viable. If such person determines that the fetus "is viable," or "if there is sufficient reason to believe that the fetus may be viable," then he must exercise the same care to preserve the fetus' life and health as would be required in the case of a fetus intended to be born alive, and must use the abortion technique providing the best opportunity for the fetus to be aborted alive, so long as a different technique is not necessary to preserve the mother's life or health. The Act, in § 5(d), also imposes a penal sanction for a violation of § 5(a)." READ THE DECISION.

"Title XIX of the Social Security Act established the Medicaid program in 1965 to provide federal financial assistance to States that choose to reimburse certain costs of medical treatment for needy persons. Since 1976, versions of the so-called Hyde Amendment have severely limited the use of any federal funds to reimburse the cost of abortions under the Medicaid program. Actions were brought in Federal District Court by appellees (including indigent pregnant women, who sued on behalf of all women similarly situated, the New York City Health and Hospitals Corp., which operates hospitals providing abortion services, officers of the Women's Division of the Board of Global Ministries of the United Methodist Church (Women's Division), and the Women's Division itself), seeking to enjoin enforcement of the Hyde Amendment on grounds that it violates,"

inter alia,

"Appellees brought a class action in Federal District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enjoin, on both federal statutory and constitutional grounds, enforcement of an Illinois statute prohibiting state medical assistance payments for all abortions except those necessary to save the life of the woman seeking the abortion. The District Court, granting injunctive relief, held that Title XIX of the Social Security Act, which established the Medicaid program, and the regulations promulgated thereunder require a participating State under such program to provide funding for all medically necessary abortions, and that the so-called Hyde Amendment prohibiting the use of federal funds to reimburse the costs of certain medically necessary abortions does not relieve a State of its independent obligation under Title XIX to provide Medicaid funding for all medically necessary abortions. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Hyde Amendment altered Title XIX in such a way as to allow States to limit funding to the categories of abortions specified in that Amendment, but that a participating State may not, consistent with Title XIX, withhold funding of those medically necessary abortions for which federal reimbursement is available under the Hyde Amendment, and the case was remanded to the District Court for modification of its injunction and with directions to consider the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment. The District Court then held that both the Illinois statute and the Hyde Amendment violate the equal protection guarantee of the Constitution insofar as they deny funding for 'medically necessary abortions prior to the point of fetal viability.'" READ THE DECISION.

"A Utah statute requires a physician to "[n]otify, if possible," the parents or guardian of a minor upon whom an abortion is to be performed. Appellant, while an unmarried minor living with and dependent on her parents, became pregnant. A physician advised her that an abortion would be in her best medical interest but, because of the statute, refused to perform the abortion without first notifying her parents. Believing that she should proceed with the abortion without notifying her parents, appellant instituted a suit in state court seeking a declaration that the statute is unconstitutional and an injunction against its enforcement. She sought to represent a class consisting of unmarried minors "who are suffering unwanted pregnancies and desire to terminate the pregnancies but may not do so" because of their physicians' insistence on complying with the statute. The trial court upheld the statute as not unconstitutionally restricting a minor's right of privacy to obtain an abortion or to enter into a doctor-patient relationship. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed." READ THE DECISION.

"An Akron, Ohio, ordinance, inter alia, (1) requires all abortions performed after the first trimester of pregnancy to be performed in a hospital (§ 1870.03); (2) prohibits a physician from performing an abortion on an unmarried minor under the age of 15 unless he obtains the consent of one of her parents or unless the minor obtains an order from a court having jurisdiction over her that the abortion be performed (§ 1870.05(B)); (3) requires that the attending physician inform his patient of the status of her pregnancy, the development of her fetus, the date of possible viability, the physical and emotional complications that may result from an abortion, and the availability of agencies to provide her with assistance and information with respect to birth control, adoption, and childbirth (§ 1870.06(B)), and also inform her of the particular risks associated with her pregnancy and the abortion technique to be employed (§ 1870.06(C)); (4) prohibits a physician from performing an abortion until 24 hours after the pregnant woman signs a consent form (§ 1870.07); and (5) requires physicians performing abortions to ensure that fetal remains are disposed of in a "humane and sanitary manner" (§ 1870.16). A violation of the ordinance is punishable as a misdemeanor. Respondents and cross-petitioners filed an action in Federal District Court against petitioners and cross-respondents, challenging the ordinance. The District Court invalidated § 1870.05(B), § 1870.06(B), and § 1870.16, but upheld § 1870.03, § 1870.06(C), and § 1870.07. The Court of Appeals affirmed as to § 1870.03, § 1870.05(B), § 1870.06(B), and § 1870.16, but reversed as to § 1870.06(C) and § 1870.07." READ THE DECISION.

"Missouri statutes require abortions after 12 weeks of pregnancy to be performed in a hospital (§ 188.025); require a pathology report for each abortion performed (§ 188.047); require the presence of a second physician during abortions performed after viability (§ 188.030.3); and require minors to secure parental consent or consent from the Juvenile Court for an abortion (§ 188.028). In an action challenging the constitutionality of these provisions, the District Court invalidated all provisions except § 188.047. The Court of Appeals reversed as to § 188.028 and § 188.047 but affirmed as to § 188.030.3 and § 188.025." READ THE DECISION.

"Appellees brought an action in Federal District Court alleging that the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982 violated the Federal Constitution and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The court denied appellees' motion for a preliminary injunction, except as to one provision of the Act which it held was invalid. The Court of Appeals, after granting appellees' motion to enjoin enforcement of the entire Act, held unconstitutional, on the basis of the intervening decisions in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U. S. 416, Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U. S. 476, and Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U. S. 506, the following provisions of the Act: (1) the portions of § 3205 that, with respect to the requirement that the woman give her "informed consent" to an abortion, require her to be informed of the name of the physician who will perform the abortion, the "particular medical risks" of the abortion procedure to be used and of carrying her child to term, and the facts that there may be "detrimental physical and psychological effects," medical assistance benefits may be available for prenatal care, childbirth, and neonatal care, the father is liable to assist in the child's support, and printed materials are available from the State that describe the fetus and list agencies offering alternatives to abortion; (2) § 3208 that requires such printed materials to include a statement that there are agencies willing to help the mother carry her child to term and to assist her after the child is born and a description of the probable anatomical and physiological characteristics of an unborn child at "two-week gestational increments"; (3) §§ 3214(a) and (h) that require the physician to report, among other things, identification of the performing and referring physicians, information as to the woman's residence, age, race, marital status, and number of prior pregnancies, and the basis for any judgment that a medical emergency existed or for any determination of nonviability, and the method of payment for the abortion, and further provide that such reports shall not be deemed public records, but shall be available for public inspection and copying in a form that will not lead to disclosure of the identity of any person filing a report; (4) § 3211(a) that requires the physician, after the first trimester, to report the basis for his determination that a child is not viable; (5) §3210(b) that requires a physician performing a postviability abortion to exercise the degree of care required to preserve the life and health of any unborn child intended to be born and to use the abortion technique that would provide the best opportunity for the unborn child to be aborted alive unless it would present a significantly greater medical risk to the pregnant woman's life or health; and (6) § 3210(c) that requires that a second physician be present during an abortion performed when viability is possible, which physician is to take all reasonable steps necessary to preserve the child's life and health. The court held that the validity of other provisions of the Act might depend on evidence adduced at the trial, and accordingly remanded these features of the case to the District Court." READ THE DECISION.

"Appellee physicians, who provide abortion services in Illinois, filed a class action in Federal District Court challenging the constitutionality of the Illinois Abortion Law of 1975, as amended, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Appellant pediatrician (hereafter appellant) filed a motion to intervene as a party defendant based on his conscientious objection to abortions and on his status as a pediatrician and as a parent of a minor daughter. The District Court granted the motion without indicating whether the intervention was permissible or as of right. Ultimately, the District Court permanently enjoined the enforcement of certain provisions of the law that impose criminal liability upon physicians for violation of the prescribed standards of care for performing abortions and the requirements for furnishing a patient with particular abortion-related information. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and also permanently enjoined the enforcement of another related provision. The State did not appeal to this Court, but filed a "letter of interest" under this Court's Rule 10.4, stating that its interest was identical to that advanced by it in the lower courts, and essentially coterminous with appellant's position." READ THE DECISION.

"On May 4, 1984, we enjoined enforcement of the Illinois Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1983 ("Act"). Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 584 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D.Ill.1984), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 763 F.2d 1532 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 484 U.S. 171, 108 S. Ct. 479, 98 L. Ed. 2d 478 (1987). We found that the statute was unconstitutional by imposing a 24 hour waiting period, and by failing to provide an adequate bypass procedure as an alternative to the statute's parental notice requirement. Defendants have now petitioned for us to review the constitutionality of the statute as supplemented by a judicial bypass rule promulgated by the Illinois Supreme Court ("Rule 307"). The defendants also ask us to lift our injunction of the 24 hour waiting period in light of the Supreme Court's decisions in Hodgson v. Minnesota, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 111 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1990) and Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S. Ct. 2972, 111 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1990) ("Akron II"). Because we find that Rule 307 fails to assure that a minor seeking an abortion is given a constitutionally valid alternative to notifying both her parents, we continue to enjoin enforcement of the Act." READ THE DECISION.

"Appellees, state-employed health professionals and private nonprofit corporations providing abortion services, brought suit in the District Court for declaratory and injunctive relief challenging the constitutionality of a Missouri statute regulating the performance of abortions. The statute, inter alia: (1) sets forth "findings" in its preamble that "[t]he life of each human being begins at conception," and that "unborn children have protectable interests in life, health, and wellbeing," §§ 1.205.1(1), (2), and requires that all state laws be interpreted to provide unborn children with the same rights enjoyed by other persons, subject to the Federal Constitution and this Court's precedents, § 1.205.2; (2) specifies that a physician, prior to performing an abortion on any woman whom he has reason to believe is 20 or more weeks pregnant, must ascertain whether the fetus is "viable" by performing "such medical examinations and tests as are necessary to make a finding of [the fetus'] gestational age, weight, and lung maturity," § 188.029; (3) prohibits the use of public employees and facilities to perform or assist abortions not necessary to save the mother's life, §§ 188.210, 188.215; and (4) makes it unlawful to use public funds, employees, or facilities for the purpose of "encouraging or counseling" a woman to have an abortion not necessary to save her life, §§ 188.205, 188.210, 188.215. The District Court struck down each of the above provisions, among others, and enjoined their enforcement. The Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling that the provisions in question violated this Court's decisions in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, and subsequent cases." READ THE DECISION.

"Subdivision 2 of Minn.Stat. § 144.343 provides that no abortion shall be performed on a woman under 18 years of age until at least 48 hours after both of her parents have been notified. The two-parent notice requirement is mandatory unless, inter alia, the woman declares that she is a victim of parental abuse or neglect, in which event notice of her declaration must be given to the proper authorities. Subdivision 6 provides that, if a court enjoins the enforcement of subdivision 2, the same two-parent notice requirement is effective unless a court of competent jurisdiction orders the abortion to proceed without notice upon proof by the minor that she is "mature and capable of giving informed consent" or that an abortion without notice to both parents would be in her best interest. Two days before the statute's effective date, a group consisting of doctors, clinics, pregnant minors, and the mother of a pregnant minor filed suit in the District Court, alleging that the statute violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court declared the statute unconstitutional in its entirety, and enjoined its enforcement. The Court of Appeals, sitting in banc, reversed. Although it rejected the State's submission that subdivision 2's two-parent notice requirement was constitutional without any bypass procedure, the court held that subdivision 6 was valid and that its bypass procedure saved the statute as a whole. The court also rejected the argument that the 48-hour waiting period imposed a significant burden on the minor's abortion right." READ THE DECISION.

"As enacted, Ohio's Amended Substitute House Bill 319 (H.B. 319) makes it a crime for a physician or other person to perform an abortion on an unmarried, unemancipated, minor woman, unless, inter alia, the physician provides timely notice to one of the minor's parents or a juvenile court issues an order authorizing the minor to consent. To obtain a judicial bypass of the notice requirement, the minor must present clear and convincing proof that she has sufficient maturity and information to make the abortion decision herself, that one of her parents has engaged in a pattern of physical, emotional, or sexual abuse against her, or that notice is not in her best interests. Among other things, H.B. 319 also allows the physician to give constructive notice if actual notice to the parent proves impossible "after a reasonable effort"; requires the minor to file a bypass complaint in the juvenile court on prescribed forms; requires that court to appoint a guardian ad litem and an attorney for the minor if she has not retained counsel; mandates expedited bypass hearings and decisions in that court and expedited review by a court of appeals; provides constructive authorization for the minor to consent to the abortion if either court fails to act in a timely fashion; and specifies that both courts must maintain the minor's anonymity and the confidentiality of all papers. Shortly before H.B. 319's effective date, appellees -- an abortion facility, one of its doctors, and an unmarried, unemancipated, minor woman seeking an abortion there -- and others filed a facial challenge to the statute's constitutionality in the Federal District Court, which ultimately issued an injunction preventing H.B. 319's enforcement. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that various of the statute's provisions were constitutionally defective." READ THE DECISION.

"Section 1008 of the Public Health Service Act specifies that none of the federal funds appropriated under the Act's Title X for family-planning services "shall be used in programs where abortion is a method of family planning." In 1988, respondent Secretary of Health and Human Services issued new regulations that, inter alia, prohibit Title X projects from engaging in counseling concerning, referrals for, and activities advocating abortion as a method of family planning, and require such projects to maintain an objective integrity and independence from the prohibited abortion activities by the use of separate facilities, personnel, and accounting records. Before the regulations could be applied, petitioners -- Title X grantees and doctors who supervise Title X funds -- filed suits, which were consolidated, challenging the regulations' facial validity and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent their implementation. In affirming the District Court's grant of summary judgment to the Secretary, the Court of Appeals held that the regulations were a permissible construction of the statute and consistent with the First and Fifth Amendments." READ THE DECISION.

"At issue are five provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982: § 3205, which requires that a woman seeking an abortion give her informed consent prior to the procedure, and specifies that she be provided with certain information at least 24 hours before the abortion is performed; § 3206, which mandates the informed consent of one parent for a minor to obtain an abortion, but provides a judicial bypass procedure; § 3209, which commands that, unless certain exceptions apply, a married woman seeking an abortion must sign a statement indicating that she has notified her husband; § 3203, which defines a "medical emergency" that will excuse compliance with the foregoing requirements; and §§ 3207(b), 3214(a), and 3214(f), which impose certain reporting requirements on facilities providing abortion services. Before any of the provisions took effect, the petitioners, five abortion clinics and a physician representing himself and a class of doctors who provide abortion services, brought this suit seeking a declaratory judgment that each of the provisions was unconstitutional on its face, as well as injunctive relief. The District Court held all the provisions unconstitutional and permanently enjoined their enforcement. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, striking down the husband notification provision but upholding the others." READ THE DECISION.

"Respondents, abortion clinics and supporting organizations, sued to enjoin petitioners, an association and individuals who organize and coordinate antiabortion demonstrations, from conducting demonstrations at clinics in the Washington, D. C., metropolitan area. The District Court held that, by conspiring to deprive women seeking abortions of their right to interstate travel, petitioners had violated the first clause of 42 U. S. C. § 1985(3), which prohibits conspiracies to deprive "any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws"; ruled for respondents on their pendent state-law claims of trespass and public nuisance; as relief on these three claims, enjoined petitioners from trespassing on, or obstructing access to, specified clinics; and, pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1988, ordered petitioners to pay respondents attorney's fees and costs on the § 1985(3) claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed." READ THE DECISION.

"After petitioners and other antiabortion protesters threatened to picket and demonstrate around a Florida abortion clinic, a state court permanently enjoined petitioners from blocking or interfering with public access to the clinic, and from physically abusing persons entering or leaving it. Later, when respondent clinic operators sought to broaden the injunction, the court found that access to the clinic was still being impeded, that petitioners' activities were having deleterious physical effects on patients and discouraging some potential patients from entering the clinic, and that doctors and clinic workers were being subjected to protests at their homes. Accordingly, the court issued an amended injunction, which applies to petitioners and persons acting "in concert" with them, and which, inter alia, excludes demonstrators from a 36-foot buffer zone around the clinic entrances and driveway and the private property to the north and west of the clinic; restricts excessive noisemaking within the earshot of, and the use of "images observable" by, patients inside the clinic; prohibits protesters within a 300-foot zone around the clinic from approaching patients and potential patients who do not consent to talk; and creates a 300-foot buffer zone around the residences of clinic staff. In upholding the amended injunction against petitioners' claim that it violated their First Amendment right to freedom of speech, the Florida Supreme Court recognized that the forum at issue is a traditional public forum; refused to apply the heightened scrutiny dictated by Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 45, because the injunction's restrictions are content neutral; and concluded that the restrictions were narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and left open ample alternative channels of communication, see ibid." READ THE DECISION.

"After petitioners and other antiabortion protesters threatened to picket and demonstrate around a Florida abortion clinic, a state court permanently enjoined petitioners from blocking or interfering with public access to the clinic, and from physically abusing persons entering or leaving it. Later, when respondent clinic operators sought to broaden the injunction, the court found that access to the clinic was still being impeded, that petitioners' activities were having deleterious physical effects on patients and discouraging some potential patients from entering the clinic, and that doctors and clinic workers were being subjected to protests at their homes. Accordingly, the court issued an amended injunction, which applies to petitioners and persons acting "in concert" with them, and which, inter alia, excludes demonstrators from a 36-foot buffer zone around the clinic entrances and driveway and the private property to the north and west of the clinic; restricts excessive noisemaking within the earshot of, and the use of "images observable" by, patients inside the clinic; prohibits protesters within a 300-foot zone around the clinic from approaching patients and potential patients who do not consent to talk; and creates a 300-foot buffer zone around the residences of clinic staff. In upholding the amended injunction against petitioners' claim that it violated their First Amendment right to freedom of speech, the Florida Supreme Court recognized that the forum at issue is a traditional public forum; refused to apply the heightened scrutiny dictated by Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 45, because the injunction's restrictions are content neutral; and concluded that the restrictions were narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and left open ample alternative channels of communication, see ibid." READ THE DECISION.

"Utah law permits abortions under only five enumerated circumstances with respect to pregnancies of 20 weeks or less, Utah Code Ann. § 76-7302(2), and under only three of those circumstances with respect to pregnancies of more than 20 weeks, § 76-7-302(3). The law also provides that the legislature "would have passed [every aspect of the law] irrespective of the fact that anyone or more provision ... be declared unconstitutional." § 76-7-317. The Federal District Court held § 302 (2) unconstitutional, but found § 302(3) to be both constitutional and severable. However, the Tenth Circuit concluded that § 302(3) was not severable, reasoning that the Utah Legislature would not have wanted to regulate later-term abortions unless it could regulate earlier-term ones." READ THE DECISION.

"Montana's Parental Notice of Abortion Act permits a court to waive the requirement that one parent be notified before a minor has an abortion if, inter alia, notification is not in the minor's best interests. The Federal District Court declared the Act unconstitutional because the judicial bypass mechanism does not authorize waiver of the notice requirement whenever the abortion itself is in the minor's best interest. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, basing its conclusion entirely on its earlier decision that Nevada's identical bypass requirement was inconsistent with Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622, and Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U. S. 502." READ THE DECISION.

"Respondents, licensed physicians and a physician assistant practicing in Montana, challenged a state law restricting the performance of abortions to licensed physicians. In denying their motion for preliminary injunction, the Federal District Court found that they had not established any likelihood of prevailing on their claim that the law imposed an undue burden under Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833. The Ninth Circuit vacated the judgment, holding that respondents had met the Circuit's threshold requirement for a preliminary injunction by showing a fair chance of success on the merits. On remand, the District Court entered an injunction pending appeal and postponed hearing the merits of the preliminary injunction motion pending the disposition of petitioner's certiorari petition. As a consequence, the physician-only requirement is unenforceable at the present time against the only nonphysician licensed to perform abortions in Montana." READ THE DECISION.

"Respondents, upstate New York abortion doctors and clinics and an organization dedicated to maintaining access to abortion services, filed a complaint in the District Court seeking to enjoin petitioners, other individuals, and three organizations from engaging in blockades and other illegal conduct at the clinics. The record shows that, before the complaint was filed, the clinics were subjected to numerous large-scale blockades in which protesters marched, stood, knelt, sat, or lay in clinic parking lot driveways and doorways, blocking or hindering cars from entering the lots, and patients and clinic employees from entering the clinics. In addition, smaller groups of protesters consistently attempted to stop or disrupt clinic operations by, among other things, milling around clinic doorways and driveway entrances, trespassing onto clinic parking lots, crowding around cars, and surrounding, crowding, jostling, grabbing, pushing, shoving, and yelling and spitting at women entering the clinics and their escorts. On the sidewalks outside the clinics, protesters called "sidewalk counselors" used similar methods in attempting to dissuade women headed toward the clinics from having abortions. The local police were unable to respond effectively to the protests due, in part, to the fact that the defendants harassed them verbally and by mail. The District Court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO), and later, after the protests and sidewalk counseling continued, a preliminary injunction. As relevant here, injunction provisions banned "demonstrating within fifteen feet ... of ... doorways or doorway entrances, parking lot entrances, driveways and driveway entrances of [clinic] facilities" (fixed buffer zones), or "within fifteen feet of any person or vehicle seeking access to or leaving such facilities" (floating buffer zones). Another provision allowed two sidewalk counselors inside the buffer zones, but required them to "cease and desist" their counseling if the counselee so requested. In its accompanying opinion, the District Court, inter alia, rejected petitioners' assertion that the injunction violated their First Amendment right to free speech. The en banc Court of Appeals affirmed." READ THE DECISION.

"Colorado Rev. Stat. § 18-9-122(3) makes it unlawful for any person within 100 feet of a health care facility's entrance to "knowingly approach" within 8 feet of another person, without that person's consent, in order to pass "a leaflet or handbill to, displa[y] a sign to, or engag[e] in oral protest, education, or counseling with [that] person .... " Claiming that the statute was facially invalid, petitioners sought to enjoin its enforcement in state court. In dismissing the complaint, the District Judge held that the statute imposed content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest under Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, in that Colorado had not "adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys," id., at 791. The State Court of Appeals affirmed, and the State Supreme Court denied review. This Court vacated that judgment in light of its holding in Schenck v. ProChoice Network of Western NY., 519 U. S. 357, that an injunctive provision creating a speech-free floating buffer zone with a 15-foot radius violated the First Amendment. On remand, the Court of Appeals reinstated its judgment, and the State Supreme Court affirmed, distinguishing Schenck, concluding that the statute was narrowly drawn to further a significant government interest, rejecting petitioners' overbreadth challenge, and concluding that ample alternative channels of communication remained open to petitioners." READ THE DECISION.

"The Constitution offers basic protection to a woman's right to choose whether to have an abortion. Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113; Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833. Before fetal viability, a woman has a right to terminate her pregnancy, id., at 870 (plurality opinion), and a state law is unconstitutional if it imposes on the woman's decision an "undue burden," i. e., if it has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the woman's path, id., at 877. Postviability, the State, in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life, may regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where "necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the [mother's] life or health." E. g., id., at 879. The Nebraska law at issue prohibits any "partial birth abortion" unless that procedure is necessary to save the mother's life. It defines "partial birth abortion" as a procedure in which the doctor "partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child before killing the ... child," and defines the latter phrase to mean "intentionally delivering into the vagina a living unborn child, or a substantial portion thereof, for the purpose of performing a procedure that the [abortionist] knows will kill the ... child and does kill the ... child." Violation of the law is a felony, and it provides for the automatic revocation of a convicted doctor's state license to practice medicine. Respondent Carhart, a Nebraska physician who performs abortions in a clinical setting, brought this suit seeking a declaration that the statute violates the Federal Constitution. The District Court held the statute unconstitutional. The Eighth Circuit affirmed." READ THE DECISION.

"Respondents, an organization that supports the legal availability of abortion and two facilities that perform abortions, filed a class action alleging that petitioners, individuals and organizations that oppose legal abortion, violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U. S. C. §§ 1962(a), (c), and (d), by engaging in a nationwide conspiracy to shut down abortion clinics through "a pattern of racketeering activity" that included acts of extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, § 1951. In concluding that petitioners violated RICO's civil provisions, the jury found, among other things, that petitioners' alleged pattern of racketeering activity included violations of, or attempts or conspiracy to violate, the Hobbs Act, state extortion law, and the Travel Act, § 1952. The jury awarded damages, and the District Court entered a permanent nationwide injunction against petitioners. Affirming in relevant part, the Seventh Circuit held, inter alia, that the things respondents claimed were extorted from them-the class women's right to seek medical services from the clinics, the clinic doctors' rights to perform their jobs, and the clinics' rights to conduct their businessconstituted "property" for purposes of the Hobbs Act. The Court of Appeals further held that petitioners "obtained" that property, as § 1951(b)(2) requires. The court also upheld the issuance of the nationwide injunction, finding that private plaintiffs are entitled to obtain injunctive relief under § 1964(c)." READ THE DECISION.

"New Hampshire’s Parental Notification Prior to Abortion Act, in relevant part, prohibits physicians from performing an abortion on a pregnant minor until 48 hours after written notice of such abortion is delivered to her parent or guardian. The Act does not require notice for an abortion necessary to prevent the minor’s death if there is insufficient time to provide notice, and permits a minor to petition a judge to authorize her physician to perform an abortion without parental notification. The Act does not explicitly permit a physician to perform an abortion in a medical emergency without parental notification. Respondents, who provide abortions for pregnant minors and expect to provide emergency abortions for them in the future, filed suit under 42 U. S. C. §1983, claiming that the Act is unconstitutional because it lacks a health exception and because of the inadequacy of the life exception and the judicial bypass’ confidentiality provision. The District Court declared the Act unconstitutional and permanently enjoined its enforcement, and the First Circuit affirmed." READ THE DECISION.

"Respondents, a national nonprofit organization that supports the legal availability of abortions and two health care clinics that perform abortions, filed a class action alleging that petitioners, individuals and organizations that oppose legal abortion, engaged in a nationwide conspiracy to shut down abortion clinics through violence and other unlawful acts. Arguing that petitioners’ activities amounted in context to extortionate acts that created a pattern of racketeering activity, respondents based their claims on, inter alia, the Hobbs Act, which makes it a federal crime to “obstruc[t], dela[y], or affec[t] commerce … by … robbery or extortion … or commit[ting] or threaten[ing] physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section,” 18 U. S. C. §1951(a), and on the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), which defines a proscribed “pattern of racketeering activity,” §1962(a), in terms of certain predicate acts that include extortion, see §1961(1). After trial, the jury concluded that petitioners violated RICO’s civil provisions, the Hobbs Act, and other extortion-related laws. In Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 537 U. S. 393 (NOW II), this Court reversed the Seventh Circuit’s affirmance of the jury’s award of damages and the District Court’s issuance of a permanent nationwide injunction. The Court noted that the Hobbs Act defines “extortion” as necessarily including the improper “ ‘obtaining of property from another,’ ” id., at 400 (quoting §1951(b)(2)); observed that the claimed “property” here consisted of a woman’s right to seek clinic services and the rights of clinic staff to perform their jobs and of clinics to provide care free from wrongful threats, violence, coercion, and fear, id., at 400–401; decided that characterizing petitioners’ actions as an “obtaining of property from” respondents went well beyond permissible boundaries, id., at 402; and held, therefore, that petitioners did not commit extortion as defined by the Hobbs Act, id., at 397. The Court concluded that, because all of the predicate acts supporting the jury’s finding of a RICO violation had to be reversed, the judgment that petitioners violated RICO must also be reversed, id., at 411. On remand, the Court of Appeals decided that, because this Court had not considered respondents’ alternative theory that the jury’s RICO verdict rested not only on extortion-related conduct, but also on four instances (or threats) of physical violence unrelated to extortion, the cases must be remanded to the District Court to determine whether these four acts alone might constitute Hobbs Act violations (sufficient, as predicate acts under RICO, to support the injunction)." READ THE DECISION.

"Following this Court’s Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U. S. 914, decision that Nebraska’s “partial birth abortion” statute violated the Federal Constitution, as interpreted in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833, and Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, Congress passed the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 (Act) to proscribe a particular method of ending fetal life in the later stages of pregnancy. The Act does not regulate the most common abortion procedures used in the first trimester of pregnancy, when the vast majority of abortions take place. In the usual second-trimester procedure, “dilation and evacuation” (D&E), the doctor dilates the cervix and then inserts surgical instruments into the uterus and maneuvers them to grab the fetus and pull it back through the cervix and vagina. The fetus is usually ripped apart as it is removed, and the doctor may take 10 to 15 passes to remove it in its entirety. The procedure that prompted the federal Act and various state statutes, including Nebraska’s, is a variation of the standard D&E, and is herein referred to as “intact D&E.” The main difference between the two procedures is that in intact D&E a doctor extracts the fetus intact or largely intact with only a few passes, pulling out its entire body instead of ripping it apart. In order to allow the head to pass through the cervix, the doctor typically pierces or crushes the skull.
The Act responded to Stenberg in two ways. First, Congress found that unlike this Court in Stenberg, it was not required to accept the District Court’s factual findings, and that that there was a moral, medical, and ethical consensus that partial-birth abortion is a gruesome and inhumane procedure that is never medically necessary and should be prohibited. Second, the Act’s language differs from that of the Nebraska statute struck down in Stenberg. Among other things, the Act prohibits “knowingly perform[ing] a partial-birth abortion … that is [not] necessary to save the life of a mother,”. It defines “partial-birth abortion,” §1531(b)(1), as a procedure in which the doctor: “(A) deliberately and intentionally vaginally delivers a living fetus until, in the case of a head-first presentation, the entire fetal head is outside the [mother’s] body … , or, in the case of breech presentation, any part of the fetal trunk past the navel is outside the [mother’s] body … , for the purpose of performing an overt act that the person knows will kill the partially delivered living fetus”; and “(B) performs the overt act, other than completion of delivery, that kills the fetus.”
In No. 05–380, respondent abortion doctors challenged the Act’s constitutionality on its face, and the Federal District Court granted a permanent injunction prohibiting petitioner Attorney General from enforcing the Act in all cases but those in which there was no dispute the fetus was viable. The court found the Act unconstitutional because it (1) lacked an exception allowing the prohibited procedure where necessary for the mother’s health and (2) covered not merely intact D&E but also other D&Es. Affirming, the Eighth Circuit found that a lack of consensus existed in the medical community as to the banned procedure’s necessity, and thus Stenberg required legislatures to err on the side of protecting women’s health by including a health exception. In No. 05–1382, respondent abortion advocacy groups brought suit challenging the Act. The District Court enjoined the Attorney General from enforcing the Act, concluding it was unconstitutional on its face because it (1) unduly burdened a woman’s ability to choose a second-trimester abortion, (2) was too vague, and (3) lacked a health exception as required by Stenberg. The Ninth Circuit agreed and affirmed." READ THE DECISION.

"Massachusetts amended its Reproductive Health Care Facilities Act to make it a crime to knowingly stand on a “public way or sidewalk” within 35 feet of an entrance or driveway to any “reproductive health care facility,” defined as “a place, other than within or upon the grounds of a hospital, where abortions are offered or performed.” Mass. Gen. Laws, 266, 120E½. Exemptions cover “employees or agents of such facility acting within the scope of their employment.” Another provision proscribes knowing obstruction of access to an abortion clinic. Abortion opponents who engage in “sidewalk counseling” sought an injunction, claiming that the amendment displaced them from their previous positions and hampered their counseling efforts; attempts to communicate with patients are also thwarted by clinic escorts, who accompany patients to clinic entrances. The district court denied the challenges. The First Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, first noting the involvement of a traditional public forum. The Court employed “time, place, and manner” analysis, stating that the Act is neither content nor viewpoint based and need not be analyzed under strict scrutiny. Although it establishes buffer zones only at abortion clinics, violations depend not “on what they say,” but on where they say it. The Act is justified without reference to the content of speech; its purposes include protecting public safety, patient access to health care, and unobstructed use of public sidewalks and streets. There was a record of crowding, obstruction, and even violence outside Massachusetts abortion clinics but not at other facilities. The exemption for employees and agents acting within the scope of their employment was not an attempt to favor one viewpoint. Even if some escorts have expressed views on abortion inside the zones, there was no evidence that such speech was authorized by any clinic. The Act, however, burdens substantially more speech than necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests. It deprives objectors of their primary methods of communicating with patients: close, personal conversations and distribution of literature. While the Act allows “protest” outside buffer zones, these objectors are not protestors; they seek to engage in personal, caring, consensual conversations with women about alternatives. Another section of the Act already prohibits deliberate obstruction of clinic entrances. Massachusetts could also enact legislation similar to the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, 18 U.S.C. 248(a), which imposes sanctions for obstructing, intimidating, or interfering with persons obtaining or providing reproductive health services. Obstruction of driveways can be addressed by traffic ordinances. Crowding was a problem only at the Boston clinic, and only on Saturday mornings; the police are capable of ordering people to temporarily disperse and of singling out lawbreakers." READ THE DECISION.

"In 2013, the Texas Legislature passed House Bill 2 (H.B. 2), which contained several provisions related to abortions. One such provision required that any physician performing an abortion have admitting privileges at a hospital within 30 miles of where the abortion was performed, and another provision required that all abortion clinics comply with standards for ambulatory surgical centers. The petitioners are a group of abortion providers who sued the State of Texas seeking to invalidate those provisions in H.B. 2 as they relate to facilities in McAllen and El Paso. The petitioners argued that H.B. 2 denied equal protection, unlawfully delegated lawmaking authority, and constituted arbitrary and unreasonable state action. The district court dismissed the equal protection, unlawful delegation, and arbitrary and unreasonable state action claims and granted declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of the two contested provisions of H.B. 2. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the equal protection, unlawful delegation, and arbitrary and unreasonable state action claims and partially reversed the injunctions because the plaintiffs failed to show that they placed a substantial burden in the path of a woman seeking an abortion." READ THE DECISION.

"The California Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act (FACT Act) regulates pro-life centers that offer pregnancy-related services. Licensed clinics must notify women that California provides free or low-cost services, including abortions, and give them a phone number. The stated purpose is to ensure that state residents know their rights and what services are available. Unlicensed clinics must notify women that California has not licensed the clinics to provide medical services. Its stated purpose is to ensure that pregnant women know when they are receiving care from licensed professionals. In a case under the First Amendment, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction." READ THE DECISION.

"Indiana’s petition for certiorari argues that the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit incorrectly invalidated two new provisions of Indiana law: the first relating to the disposition of fetal remains by abortion providers; and the second barring the knowing provision of sex-, race-, or disability-selective abortions by abortion providers." READ THE DECISION.

"Louisiana’s Act 620, which is almost word-for-word identical to the Texas “admitting privileges” law at issue in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U. S. ___, requires any doctor who performs abortions to hold “active admitting privileges at a hospital . . . located not further than thirty miles from the location at which the abortion is performed or induced,” and defines “active admitting privileges” as being “a member in good standing” of the hospital’s “medical staff . . . with the ability to admit a patient and to provide diagnostic and surgical services to such patient.”
In these consolidated cases, five abortion clinics and four abortion providers challenged Act 620 before it was to take effect, alleging that it was unconstitutional because (among other things) it imposed an undue burden on the right of their patients to obtain an abortion. (The plaintiff providers and two additional doctors are referred to as Does 1 through 6.) The plaintiffs asked for a temporary restraining order (TRO), followed by a preliminary injunction to prevent the law from taking effect. The defendant (State) opposed the TRO request but also urged the court not to delay ruling on the preliminary injunction motion, asserting that there was no doubt about the physicians’ standing. Rather than staying the Act’s effective date, the District Court provisionally forbade the State to enforce the Act’s penalties, while directing the plaintiff doctors to continue to seek privileges and to keep the court apprised of their progress. Several months later, after a 6-day bench trial, the District Court declared Act 620 unconstitutional on its face and preliminarily enjoined its enforcement. On remand in light of Whole Woman’s Health, the District Court ruled favorably on the plaintiffs’ request for a permanent injunction on the basis of the record previously developed, finding, among other things, that the law offers no significant health benefit; that conditions on admitting privileges common to hospitals throughout the State have made and will continue to make it impossible for abortion providers to obtain conforming privileges for reasons that have nothing to do with the State’s asserted interests in promoting women’s health and safety; and that this inability places a substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking an abortion. The court concluded that the law imposes an undue burden and is thus unconstitutional. The Fifth Circuit reversed, agreeing with the District Court’s interpretation of the standards that apply to abortion regulations, but disagreeing with nearly every one of the District Court’s factual findings." READ THE DECISION.

"The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) requires covered employers to provide women with “preventive care and screenings” without “any cost sharing requirements,” and relies on Preventive Care Guidelines (Guidelines) “supported by the Health Resources and Services Administration” (HRSA) to determine what “preventive care and screenings” includes. 42 U. S. C. §300gg–13(a)(4). Those Guidelines mandate that health plans provide coverage for all Food and Drug Administration approved contraceptive methods. When the Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury (Departments) incorporated the Guidelines, they also gave HRSA the discretion to exempt religious employers, such as churches, from providing contraceptive coverage. Later, the Departments also promulgated a rule accommodating qualifying religious organizations that allowed them to opt out of coverage by self-certifying that they met certain criteria to their health insurance issuer, which would then exclude contraceptive coverage from the employer’s plan and provide participants with separate payments for contraceptive services without imposing any cost-sharing requirements.
Religious entities challenged the rules under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, this Court held that the contraceptive mandate substantially burdened the free exercise of closely held corporations with sincerely held religious objections to providing their employees with certain methods of contraception. And in Zubik v. Burwell, 578 U. S. ___, the Court opted to remand without deciding the RFRA question in cases challenging the self-certification accommodation so that the parties could develop an approach that would accommodate employers’ concerns while providing women full and equal coverage.
Under Zubik’s direction and in light of Hobby Lobby’s holding, the Departments promulgated two interim final rules (IFRs). The first significantly expanded the church exemption to include an employer that “objects . . . based on its sincerely held religious beliefs,” “to its establishing, maintaining, providing, offering, or arranging [for] coverage or payments for some or all contraceptive services.” 82 Fed. Reg. 47812. The second created a similar “moral exemption” for employers with sincerely held moral objections to providing some or all forms of contraceptive coverage. The Departments requested post-promulgation comments on both IFRs.
Pennsylvania sued, alleging that the IFRs were procedurally and substantively invalid under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). After the Departments issued final rules, responding to post-promulgation comments but leaving the IFRs largely intact, New Jersey joined Pennsylvania’s suit. Together they filed an amended complaint, alleging that the rules were substantively unlawful because the Departments lacked statutory authority under either the ACA or RFRA to promulgate the exemptions. They also argued that the rules were procedurally defective because the Departments failed to comply with the APA’s notice and comment procedures. The District Court issued a preliminary nationwide injunction against the implementation of the final rules, and the Third Circuit affirmed." READ THE DECISION.

"Mississippi’s Gestational Age Act provides that “[e]xcept in a medical emergency or in the case of a severe fetal abnormality, a person shall not intentionally or knowingly perform . . . or induce an abortion of an unborn human being if the probable gestational age of the unborn human being has been determined to be greater than fifteen (15) weeks.” Miss. Code Ann. §41–41–191. Respondents—Jackson Women’s Health Organization, an abortion clinic, and one of its doctors—challenged the Act in Federal District Court, alleging that it violated this Court’s precedents establishing a constitutional right to abortion, in particular Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of respondents and permanently enjoined enforcement of the Act, reasoning that Mississippi’s 15-week restriction on abortion violates this Court’s cases forbidding States to ban abortion pre-viability. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. Before this Court, petitioners defend the Act on the grounds that Roe and Casey were wrongly decided and that the Act is constitutional because it satisfies rational-basis review." READ THE DECISION.

"In 2000, the Food and Drug Administration approved a new drug application for mifepristone tablets marketed under the brand name Mifeprex for use in terminating pregnancies up to seven weeks. To help ensure that Mifeprex would be used safely and effectively, FDA placed additional restrictions on the drug’s use and distribution, for example requiring doctors to prescribe or to supervise prescription of Mifeprex, and requiring patients to have three in-person visits with the doctor to receive the drug. In 2016, FDA relaxed some of these restrictions: deeming Mifeprex safe to terminate pregnancies up to 10 weeks; allowing healthcare providers, such as nurse practitioners, to prescribe Mifeprex; and approving a dosing regimen that required just one in-person visit to receive the drug. In 2019, FDA approved an application for generic mifepristone. In 2021, FDA announced that it would no longer enforce the initial in-person visit requirement. Four pro-life medical associations and several individual doctors moved for a preliminary injunction that would require FDA either to rescind approval of mifepristone or to rescind FDA’s 2016 and 2021 regulatory actions. Danco Laboratories, which sponsors Mifeprex, intervened to defend FDA’s actions.

The District Court agreed with the plaintiffs and in effect enjoined FDA’s approval of mifepristone, thereby ordering mifepristone off the market. FDA and Danco appealed and moved to stay the District Court’s order pending appeal. As relevant here, this Court ultimately stayed the District Court’s order pending the disposition of proceedings in the Fifth Circuit and this Court. On the merits, the Fifth Circuit held that plaintiffs had standing. It concluded that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their challenge to FDA’s 2000 and 2019 drug approvals, but were likely to succeed in showing that FDA’s 2016 and 2021 actions were unlawful. This Court granted certiorari with respect to the 2016 and 2021 FDA actions." READ THE DECISION.

"Idaho enacted a law that prohibits abortions with a narrow exception to prevent the death of the woman. The federal government sued Idaho, arguing that the state could not enforce its abortion ban in certain situations governed by the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act. Under EMTALA, a hospital that receives Medicare funding must provide necessary stabilizing treatment in its emergency room to a patient in an emergency medical condition. The federal government argued that this provision prevented Idaho from prohibiting abortions in hospitals when necessary to prevent serious harm to a woman's health, an exception not explicitly included in its abortion law.

The district court granted a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the Idaho abortion law in these circumstances. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals declined to stay the injunction. Idaho appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Initially, the Supreme Court stayed the injunction and granted Idaho's petition for certiorari before judgment. However, in a one-sentence per curiam opinion, it dismissed the writs of certiorari before judgment and vacated the stay that it had entered in January. This left the original district court preliminary injunction in place." READ THE DECISION.